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Comment
The Pennsylvania Adoption Act of 1970:
Progress and Portents
INTRODUCTION

The Pennsylvania Adoption Act of 1970, effective 1 January 1971,
consists of six articles by which the preceding Adoption Act as amended
is "repealed absolutely," along with "all other acts and parts of acts...
insofar as they are inconsistent" with this Act.' Though there are varied
substantive changes which will be dealt with infra., one prominent feature of the new Act is worthy of note at the outset. From the lengthy,
sometimes unclear paragraphing of the previous act has come a concise
statement of the law in the pattern of the Estates Act of 1947. This
structural format is, in itself, laudable were nothing else accomplished.
A great deal has been accomplished, however, and this paper shall
cover at some length a number of these accomplishments.
Although it is difficult to sever the various parts from the whole, it is
clear that Articles III and IV are the heart of the substantive provisions
of the Act. As a result, the scope of this paper shall be limited to an
analysis of those articles, the changes they accomplish, and the ramifications of those changes to adoption practices in Pennsylvania.
Article III, entitled "Proceedings Prior to Petition to Adopt," is
divided into four components. Provision A deals with voluntary relinquishment of parental rights to a child under the age of 18 years. Under
this provision, the subsequent recipient of custody may be either an
individual intending to adopt the child or an agency. Provision B treats
the problems of involuntary termination, grounds for such termination, and the method of its accomplishment. Part C deals with the effect
of the decree of termination; and D provides for the reporting of intention to adopt, -intermediary's reports, and investigation.
Article IV treats the adoption proceeding itself. Divided into three
sub-headings, this article provides for requisite petitions, consents, and
conducting of hearings.
1. Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. - Act No. 208, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 601(a)
and (b) (Supp. 1970). When cited hereafter, references will be noted as "Pa. Adoption Act
of 1970" with appropriate sections cited.
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The two Articles are procedurally intertwined. To discuss one is to
discuss the other. However, in the interest of clarity this paper shall
proceed, to whatever degree possible, from the sections of Article III to
those of Article IV. Where this is not workable, cross-references to the
other Article and sections will be limited to those portions immediately
relevant and logically unseverable. With these introductory limitations
aside, a discussion of the Act itself is in order, commencing with Article
III.
ARTICLE III

As noted above, Article III-"Proceedings Prior to Petition to
Adopt"-begins with sub-article A dealing with voluntary relinquishment of parental rights. These rights may be relinquished either to an
agency or to an individual. Section 301 provides the method for relinquishment to an agency. This section corresponds closely to section 1.1
of the Adoption Act of 1925 added in August 1953 and amended in
1961.2 Under section 301, the requirements of the natural parents' petition and the 5-day custody of the child under 18 are maintained. In
addition, the agency is still required to join in the petition. In contrast,
however, section 301 requires the joining agency to aver in the petition
that it consents "to accept custody of the child until such time as the
child is adopted." 3 It is not readily apparent why this provision was
added to the information contained in the petition. Under the provisions of the earlier act, if termination were granted, the decree of the
court directed the transfer of custody to the agency without more. It
would appear that by the simple expedient of having had custody of
the child for 5 days, the agency was presumed to consent to accept
further custody by joining in the petition. According to section 321 of
the new Act, the effect of a decree of voluntary termination is to award
custody of the child to the agency "consenting to accept custody" with
no more difficulty than under the old section 1.1. It would seem then
that this provision is not necessary or even desirable. Apparently, as
the law now stands, the court could, at the hearing, terminate the parental rights and duties of the petitioners only to have such a decree nullified on the technicality that the agency had neglected to give its express
2.

Act of April 4, 1925, P.L. 127, § 1.1, added August 26, 1953, P.L. 1411, amended

1961, PURDON'S PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1.1 (Supp. 1970). When cited hereafter, references

will be noted as "Pa. Adoption Act of 1925, as amended," with appropriate sections cited.
3. Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 301.
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consent to accept custody of the child. The introduction of this ambiguity is unwarranted and the addition of express consent seems to be of
no advantage over the older provisions. Simply by joining in the petition the agency so filing should lose its discretion to refuse custody-whether expressly consenting or not-in the interest of efficient administration under section 301. There is one possible justification for the
"safeguard" of the consent proviso. With the expanded definition of
agency found in section 102 (2) of the new Act the expression of consent
to accept custody may be designed merely to impress upon the agency
the solemnity of their undertaking.4 Even accepting this hypothesis,
however, the provision does not seem to add any noteworthy safeguard.
Section 302 of the new Act provides a radical change to the process of
voluntary termination. This section provides, inter alia, for awarding
custody of a child to an individual. Under 302, any individual who has
had exclusive care of the child for a minimum of 30 days, has filed the
requisite report of intention to adopt under sections 331 and 332, and
has filed a separate consent to accept custody of the child, may be
awarded custody in a voluntary relinquishment proceeding.5 In such
instance, the effect of a decree awarding custody is to terminate forever
the natural parents' rights in the child.6 This leaves unchanged the duty
of that parent toward the child until final adoption. The natural parent
still bears the obligation to support the child although parental rights
accrue immediately to the person receiving custody.
Such a decree results from a hearing provided for by section 303, in
terms identical in effect to those of the previous Act. The hearing must
be private and held not less than 10 days after the filing of the petition.
Upon a finding of whether or not termination shall be allowed the
court may issue its decree. The effect of the decree is set out concisely
in section 321, rather than incorporated in an unwieldy single paragraph as in section 1.1 of the old Act. Assuming termination is decreed,
4. Compare Pa. Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, § l(a), and Pa. Adoption Act of
1970, § 102(2). Pa. Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, § l(a):
"Approved Agency or Institution" means a county institution district or an agency
or institution incorporated under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and approved by the State Department of Welfare.
Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 102(2):
"Agency" means any incorporated or unincorporated organization, society, institution, or other entity, public or voluntary, which may receive or provide for the
care of children, supervised by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and
providing adoption services in accordance with standards established by the department.
5. Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 302.
6. Id. § 303.
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the effect of the decree is as follows. All parental rights in the child are
terminated when the recipient of the child is an individual. When the
recipient is an agency, the termination goes to both rights and duties of
the parent. In either case, however, the rights of the natural parent(s)
are extinguished completely and forever and the agency or person receiving custody stands in loco parentis to the child. Among his or its
powers are now listed a representative group of capabilities which
greatly expand the explicit limitations of the previous Act. Under section 1.1 of the old Act the agency was awarded custody but was expressly authorized only to give consent to subsequent adoption of the
child. The person or agency now stands in a more truly parental position. He or it may now give consent to the child's marriage, to psychiatric and surgical treatment, and is given "such .
authority concern'7
ing the child as a natural parent could exercise.
Thus, as can be seen, under the new Act the natural family entity
may be terminated voluntarily with custody of the child awarded to an
agency or to an individual. Because of the new recipients of custody,
there is now provided the explicit differentiation of rights or concurrent rights and duties discussed above.
Sub-article B of Article III, entitled "Involuntary Termination,"
provides the most radical departure from the old Act. Under section 1.2
of the Act of 1925, as amended, the sole ground for involuntary termination of parental rights was abandonment. As defined in section 1(a)
of that act, abandonment amounted to "conduct on the part of a parent
which evidences a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to the
child and of refusing or failing to perform parental duties." (Emphasis
Added.)8 For the court to make such a finding, section 1.2 of the old
Act detailed the manner in which such a proceeding should be commenced and by whom. The requirements may be summarized as
follows. Section 1.2 applied only to persons under the age of 18 years.
If such person had been in the care of an approved agency or institution for 30 days or longer, and had apparently been abandoned by its
natural parents for 6 months or more, that agency was authorized to
petition for a finding of abandonment and to request custody of the
child. Upon the filing of such a petition, the court fixed a time for a
hearing to be held not less than 10 days after the petition was presented.
The natural parents were notified in writing by registered mail at his
7.
8.

Id. § 321.
Pa. Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, § 1(a).
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or their last known address at least 5 days prior to such hearing date,9
and the court then determined the question of abandonment. Were
abandonment found, the court so decreed and awarded custody to the
agency, authorizing that agency to consent to later adoption of the child
without further consent by or notification of the natural parents. Under
the new Act the separate pre-adoption proceedings are wisely maintained but substantive and procedural provisions are greatly modified
and expanded.
The new requirements for involuntary termination of the natural
family status are found in sections 311, 312, 313, and 321. The most
notable change initially is found in the wider variety of parties eligible
to institute such proceedings. Those qualified now are:
(1) either parent when termination is sought with respect to the
other parent; (2) an agency; or (3) an individual having custody
or standing in loco parentis to the child and who has filed a report
of intention to adopt pursuant to section 331.10
The person seeking involuntary termination files his petition averring
that he will assume custody pending adoption according to section 312.
Under section 313 the court then fixes a time for hearing within the
same time limitations found in the old Act. Notification requirements
are modified in section 313. The old Act required that the parent be
notified by the method mentioned above at least five days prior to the
hearing. Now the parents whose rights are to be terminated are given
10 days' notice "by registered or certified mail to his or their last known
address or by such other means as the court may require."" The hearing
may then be held and a finding made of termination vel non of parental
rights. That determination is to be made upon the finding of grounds
provided in section 311. The grounds are three-a finding of any of
which may end the rights of the natural parent or parents. They are:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child, or has refused or failed to perform
parental duties; or (2) [t]he repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect, or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary
for his physical or mental well-being and the condition and causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or will not be
9. Id. § 1.2.
10. Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 312.
11. Id. § 313.
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remedied by the parent; or (3) [t]he parent is the presumptive but
not the natural father of the child. 12 (Emphasis Added.)
These provisions are a substantial departure from the old Act's requirements. The sole ground for such termination under the old Actabandonment-as defined in section l(a), corresponds to the first
ground of the new Act, but with the following modifications. In the
old Act the two phrases used in the definition of abandonment, i.e.,
"settled purpose . . ." and "refusing or failing . . .", were connected by
the conjunctive "and." As a result, abandonment was construed as
largely "a matter of intention"' 3 on the part of the parent to relinquish
parental claims and to refuse or fail to perform parental duties. Both
had to exist to show abandonment. Under the new statute, the substantially identical wording of (1), above, has been connected by the
disjunctive "or." This would seem to indicate a legislative intent to
broaden considerably the grounds for involuntary termination. This
is more emphatically so when this ground is read in the context of the
remaining provisions of section 311. The reason for such a purposeful
expansion must be found in the time-honored "heavily weighted interests of the child."' 4 This overriding concern pervades the other
grounds as well. The second ground displays this great concern in
near-pristine form. The inclusion therein of terms such as "abuse,"
"neglect," and "refusal" are readily acceptable as prima facie indications of parental unfitness. However, twice mentioned within that single
provision are terms dealing with "incapacity" and conditions which
"cannot" be remedied by the parent. The ability of the courts to terminate a parent's rights to his child because of that parent's inability to
provide "essential parental care, control or subsistence," or the parent's
incapacity to remedy the conditions or causes of such a plight, will provide the framework for many extremely difficult decisions in our courts.
This is an area highly charged with emotion. It is not at all difficult
to envision cases where it is clear that the child is lacking certain
parental care and the deficient parent is simply incapable of correcting
the condition. Of course, under the terms of the Adoption Act, the
parent is in imminent danger of losing his or her child. What will be
12.

Id. § 311.

13. In Re Adoption of Susko, 363 Pa. 78, 69 A.2d 132 (1949), Adoption of Harvey,
375 Pa. 1, 99 A.2d 276 (1953), In Re Adoption of Peter, 177 Pa. Super. 365, 110 A.2d 825
.(1955).
14. Comment, Improving the Adoption Process: The Pennsylvania Adoption Act, 102
U. PA. L. REv. 759, 775 (1954). See also Infausto, Annual Review of Decisions and Statutory Revisions Affecting Adoptions, FAMILY LAW Q. Vol. IV, no. 2, June 1970.
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the emotional impact of such a severance of family bonds upon the
child? How overriding is the lack of control when balanced against a
close family harmony which may exist in spite of the hardship? Is the
"mental well-being" of the child more surely preserved by a termination
of its parents' rights to it or by allowing the child to remain with its
parent(s) in the face of deprivation of another sort? These are merely
a superficial excursion through the myriad difficulties which will surely
face our courts under this proviso. The terms of the Act carry their
own portents. The gloom is lightened only by the inherent discretionary powers of the court. Section 311 provides only that the parental
rights may be terminated upon the discovery of grounds which conform
to the letter of this section. Nonetheless, this area will cause many a
difficult duty to be laid upon the courts in this type of proceeding.
The final ground upon which a parent may involuntarily lose rights
in his child provides further difficulties, albeit of a less moral and
more legal orientation. Section 311(3) provides that a parent's rights
in a child may be extinguished on the ground that he is merely the
presumptive, but not the natural father of the child. The deceptively
simple language read in conjunction with a provision of section 313
rapidly becomes more complicated. Section 313 treats of the hearing
to be held on a petition filed pursuant to section 312 requesting involuntary termination of parental rights. During such a hearing the
natural mother of the child is declared to "be a competent witness as to
whether the presumptive father is the natural father of the child."' 1
Because, under the provisions of section 312(i), one parent may file a
petition to have the parental rights of the other terminated involuntarily; because section 311(3) provides the grounds; and because section
313 makes the wife competent to testify as to the natural father, the
process by which the presumptive (but not the natural) father's parental
rights may be extinguished might follow this pattern.
The natural mother and wife of the "father," as a party capable of
filing a petition seeking the termination of the "father's" parental rights
under section 312(i), so files, averring that she consents to accept custody
until such time as the child may be adopted. The other parent is given
the required 10 days' notice by registered mail pursuant to section 313.
At the future hearing, the mother, now a competent witness to testify
that her husband is merely the presumptive, but not the natural, father
of the child by section 313, appears and so testifies. Upon this evidence
15.
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the court may then decree the termination of the husband's parental
rights.10 Should such a decree be issued, the mother can then arrange for
the voluntary relinquishment of her own rights in the child and allow
the adoption without the further consent of the husband whose rights
have been terminated. 17 This hypothetical process clearly presents
serious questions. Implicit in these facts are constitutional problems of
notice, or lack thereof, in violation of the due process of law requirement, and deprivation of "property" in violation of the same due process mandate.' 8 It is felt, however, that digression into the constitutional
issues raised is beyond the scope of this paper. The simple mention of
such problems serves. Another more mundane concern is not so easily
sidestepped, however. What recourse has the husband in such circumstances? Even were he to be served personally and appear to contest the
proceedings, if, indeed, he is but the presumptive father, he is defenseless. It may prove small solace to him that the court is not required by
the terms of the Adoption Act to terminate his rights if to do so may
not serve the best interests of the child. If, on the other hand, the husband claims to be natural father of the child the question as to his
competency to testify in his own behalf is raised. This entails a reconsideration of the concerns dealt with in the recent case of Commonwealth ex. rel. Leider v. Leider.'9 In light of the inclination there shown
toward liberalizing the so-called "non-access" rule by allowing parents
and a former spouse to testify concerning non-access--even at the risk
of bastardizing the child-and the specific statutory provision in the
Adoption Act of 1970 allowing the wife-mother to testify, it would
seem that the husband here stands a good chance of being permitted
to testify in his own behalf in such a case. His claim to be the natural
father against his wife's contrary claim would certainly not be in derogation of the policy behind the rule which prevents such testimony. If
anything, his testimony would be directly in harmony with the preservation of the presumption of legitimacy of children born in lawful wedlock. 20 Were he competent to testify and claim to be the natural father,
he could hinder substantially his wife's attempt to terminate his parental rights, if it were merely her word against his, for the presumption of
the child's legitimacy would then be in his favor.
16.
17.
18.
57, 59
19.
20.

Id. § 311(3).
Id. §§ 321 and 414.
For discussion see Goldman, Adoption: New Law, New Problems, 59 Dicy. L. REv.
(1954-55).
Leider v. Leider 434 Pa. 293, 254 A.2d 306 (1968).
Id.
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Lest this concern be dismissed out of hand as too speculative or
frivolous, it is worthy of note that such proceedings have occurred
and have been followed in other jurisdictions. In Burtis v. Weiser 21
the plaintiff-husband married a woman visibly pregnant two days
after her divorce from her previous husband. Plaintiff accepted and
supported the child after its birth. This support continued in the
form of allotments to his wife which he had sent while he was apart
from her during one year of overseas military service. While he was
gone, plaintiff learned that the wife had allowed the child's adoption.
Plaintiff then challenged the validity of the adoption on the ground
that it had been allowed without his consent in violation of Article
46a, section 6 of the, then, Texas Adoption Statute. 22 The validity
of the adoption was upheld by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas
on the basis of that court's acceptance of the presumption that the
"husband of a woman at the time of the conception of a child is the
father of such child" rather than the presumption that the husband
at the time of birth is the child's father. 23 Although this decision
rested upon the acceptance of one presumption over another, the
result is noteworthy. In order for the court to have reached this
decision it seems clear that testimony must have been permitted in
evidence to show that a child born in lawful wedlock was not the
natural child of the married couple. The Texas court was led from
that point to a choice of presumptions. The hypothetical husband
in Pennsylvania has not even the aid of a possible contrary presumption. There is no need for indulging in evaluation of conflicting presumptions. The mother's competent testimony removes any need for
such resort. The question is not "who else might the natural father
be?" but rather simply, "is this husband the natural father as well as
the presumptive father?" The testimony can readily-perhaps too
readily-answer that question. Granted, it is still a question of meeting a certain burden of proof. However, if the husband is not the
natural father and knows it, there remains no burden upon the wife.
Her testimony is, in effect, conclusive. The husband can rely solely
upon the discretionary power of the court to refuse to allow termina21. Burtis v. Weiser, 195 S.W. 2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946). For a discussion of this
case see 95 U. PA. L. REv. 216 (1946).
22. 1 TEx. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) Art. 46a, § 6, provides in part,
"No adoption shall be permitted except with the written consent of the living parents of
the child. . . . In case of a child not born in lawful wedlock, the consent of the father
shall not be necessary." [The provision of this statute has since been amended.]
23. Burtis v. Weiser, supra note 21, at 843.
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tion of his rights, because to do so would not be in "the best interests
of the child." There is no need further to belabor the problem. That
it exists, must be recognized for the danger that it represents, and must
be reckoned with carefully, is sufficient.
Having thus considered some inherent problems regarding the
grounds for involuntary termination of parental rights, it is now useful
to revisit the provisions of section 321 to determine the effect which a
decree of termination has under involuntary termination proceedings.
The provisions of section 321 include the effects of a decree of termination of parental rights whether voluntary or involuntary. There is no
explicit difference in effect under either proceeding. The determinative
factor again is the recipient of custody. An award of custody, under
section 312 proceedings, to an individual parent 24 or an individual
having custody or standing in loco parentis, who intends to adopt the
child, 25 does not relieve the delinquent parent of his or her parental
duty but only the parental rights. Where the recipient is an agency, 26
the defaulting parent or parents are relieved of his or their parental
duties with the coexistent loss of parental rights.
Interspersed in the preceding discussion have been references to certain requisite reports and petitions. Mention of them has been as
prerequisites without discussion of their form and/or content. It is in
order at this juncture to discuss these reports and to reweave them into
the fabric of the provisions to which they apply.
Under the terms of the new Act dealing with voluntary termination
there are two possible recipients to whom parental rights may be relinquished-an agency,27 or an individual who has had custody of a child
for 30 days and has filed a report of intention to adopt. 28 Under the

provisions of section 312 are set forth those persons to whom custody
may be awarded following involuntary termination, one of whom is
the individual who has filed a report of intention to adopt in accordance
with section 331. Because of the resulting importance of this report a
short discussion of its content and purpose follows.
This report shall be filed by both individuals and agencies acting as
intermediaries placing a child under 18 years of age for adoption. This
written report must be filed under oath to the court in which the adop24.
25.
26.

Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 312(i).
Id. § 312 (iii).
Id. § 312 (ii).

27. Id. § 301.
28. Id. § 302.
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tion petition will be filed. The adopting parent or parents shall then be
given notice of the filing of the report and the date. The information
required to be included in this report is included in a footnote because
of its importance and scope. 29 In addition to this information, in accordance with section 334 there shall be attached to the report as
exhibits: (1) a birth certificate or certification of registration of birth
of the child; (2) all consents required by section 411(3), (4) and (5) (discussed below); and (3) a certified copy of any decree of termination
made by a court other then the court in which the petition for adoption
will be filed. These requirements, while clear and explicit, may present
problems to the adopting parent(s). If an agency intermediary is
involved in the placement of the child, the entire background of that
child is information unavailable to the adopting parents. In the parents'
report of intention to adopt only the name and address of the agency
and the circumstances surrounding the receipt of custody by the adopting parents are required by section 331. The report of the agency intermediary is filed to the court and the results of any investigation (section
335 below) likewise go to the court. The adopting parents are completely uninformed as to the history of the child whom they will adopt.
The question is simply whether or not this is desirable. If the child is
extremely young, knowledge of its background may not be helpful to
the adopting parents in raising the child. However, what of the child
who is, for example, approximately five years old? It is commonly accepted fact that the psychological make-up of a person is to a great
29. Id. § 333 which provides that the following information is to be set forth:
(1) The name and address of the intermediary;
(2) The name, sex, racial background, age, date and place of birth, and religious
affiliation of the child;
(3) The date of the placement of the child with the adopting parent or parents;
(4) The name, racial background, age, marital status as of the time of birth of
the child and during one year prior thereto, and religious affiliation of the parents
of the child (or of the mother only in the case of an illegitimate child);
(5) Identification of proceedings in which any decree of termination of parental
rights, or parental rights and duties, with respect to the child was entered;
(6) The residence of the parents or parent of the child, if there has been no such
decree of termination;
(7) A statement that all consents required by section 411 (3), (4) and (5), are attached as exhibits or the basis upon which such consents are not required;
(8) The fee or expenses paid or to be paid to or received by the intermediary or
to or by any other person or persons to the knowledge of the intermediary by reason
of the adoption placement;
(9) A full description and statement of the value of all property owned or possessed
by the child; and
(10) A statement that no provison of any act regulating the importation of dependent, delinquent or defective children has been violated with respect to the placement
of the child.
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extent dominated by his experiences in very early life. Accepting this
premise, it is difficult to see the benefit of witholding the child's back_ground from the parents who will raise him. How can an adoptive
parent be expected to understand and correct his adopted child's problems when he is unable to make any rational evaluation of their causes?
The difficulty of child-raising is infinitely increased by the parents' lack
of knowledge of their child's psychic exposure and experiences. The
difficulty facing these parents is clear, but what of the effect upon the
child? As indicated above, the parents may well be hamstrung in their
parental duties by their lack of knowledge of the child's background.
This unnecessary disability strips from them some portion of their
power to guide the child and help him to healthy development. In short,
the child may well receive less than the complete help which his adoptive parents might have been able to give him had they but known his
background. The unfairness to the parents pales beside the possible
damage to the child-damage which might have been prevented. The
apparent regard for evenhanded administration of adoption might well
stand reconsideration in view of these fears. Another effect of this situation might well be the promotion of the use of placement without an
intermediary whenever possible, and to avoid particularly placement
by an agency. Because a prospective parent is undoubtedly concerned
with any adopted child's background, it is in the parent's best interest
to seek placement by means which afford him the greatest access to
knowledge of the child-an individual intermediary or no intermediary. It is suggested that this inclination might well be contrary to the
intent of the legislature when passing these provisions. Because of the
traditional fear of individual placement, it appears inconsistent to promote, in effect, this method over the use of agencies.
The final provision of Article III is section 335 which provides that
upon filing of the section 331 report of intention to adopt, the court
shall cause to be made an investigation directed at the background of
the child and of the adopting parents. This section leaves virtually unchanged the investigation requirements of the previous Act as provided
in the final paragraph of section 1(c). As a result, it is felt that further
coverage here would not be of value.
The preceding pages have covered with varying emphasis the provisions of the Adoption Act of 1970 which encompass pre-adoption
proceedings. It is now appropriate to survey the sections of Article IV
dealing with the adoption process itself.
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ARTICLE IV

Sub-article A provides for the petition for adoption and sections 401
and 402 therein detail respectively the information and attached exhibits required. These requirements are clearly set out and in large
measure simply codify the previous Act's section l(d). The single notable difference has been adverted to above, dealing with the information
available to petitioning adopting parents. The change appears in
paragraphs (2) and (5) of section 401.
Under the Act of 1925, as amended, the petition for adoption included, inter alia, "the name, color, age, date, and place of birth, places
of residence since birth, and religious affiliation of the person proposed
to be adopted."8 0 This information under the new Act is embodied in
82
the report of the intermediary,"' or the report of intention to adopt.
Paragraph (2) of section 401 now requires that the adoption petition
set forth "that the reports of sections 331 and 333 have been filed, if
required."8 3 Paragraph (5) then states "if there is no intermediary or
if no report of the intermediary has been filed, or if the adoptee is over
the age of eighteen years, all vital statistics and other information
enumerated and required to be stated of record by section 333

. ..

" shall

be set forth.84 The result is that the information previously required
to be contained within the petition itself, under the above circumstance,
may now be found in the various reports, with the attendant dangers
discussed earlier (the lack of information available to the adopting
parents).
Sub-article B deals with consents to adoption, and the four sections
thereunder clearly lay out the requirements as to when consent is and
is not required, and whose consent is involved. These requirements are
the logical result of the provisions of Article III, reflecting the revisions
of that article. Where, however, Article III provisions have not so
required, the requirements as to consent remain as previously provided
by sections 2, 2.1, and 2.2 of the Adoption Act of 1925, as amended.
The most substantial change in consent requirements deals with the
consent of the natural father. Section 411(3) provides:
The consent of the husband of the mother shall not be necessary
if, after notice to the husband, it is proved to the satisfaction of the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
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Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, j 1(d).
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§ 331.
§ 401(2).
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court by evidence, including testimony of the natural mother, that
the husband of the natural mother is not the natural father of the
child.8 5
This language, of course, reflects the provisions of Article III, sections
311(3), 312, and 321 as discussed above. In the absence of such proof,
however, the presumption of legitimacy controls the situation and "the
consent of a former husband of the natural mother shall be required if
he was the husband of the natural mother at any time within one year
prior to the birth of the adoptee."' 6
The remaining provisions dealing with consent appear to be in
accord with those requirements of the previous Act with only minor
modifications. The dispensing with consents under section 413 corresponds to the provisions of section 2.1 of the previous Act with this
minor change. The consent of the adoptee, alone, is required when he
is over 18 years of age and has lived with the adopting parent or parents
for at least three continuous years.8 7 The previous residency require8s
ment was ten years.
Section 414, which deals with when parental consent is not required,
corresponds with section 2(c) of the old Act but simply reflects the
terminology of the new Act and the expanded grounds for loss of
parental rights under section 311.
Sub-article C, entitled, simply, "Hearings," comprises five sections
(421-425) covering respectively, notice, place of hearing, attendance at
the hearing, testimony and investigation, and religious belief. Under
section 3 of the previous Act the hearing was to be held not less than
ten days from the time of the filing of the adoption petition, while
under section 421 no specific time is mandated. Notice of these proceedings shall be given "to all persons whose required consent has not
been obtained" and such others as the court may direct,8 9 and shall
be made by personal service or by registered or certified mail or by such
other manner as the court may direct. This method of notification does
not necessarily apply to the adopting parents, however. They may be
notified-if such notification is required-by the intermediary or someone acting in his behalf. Upon notification of all required parties,
a hearing may be held either in private, or in open court, at the court's
S5. Id.

§ 411(3).

36. Id.

37. Id. § 413(1).
38.
39.
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discretion. 40 Those persons who must attend, and when their attendance
is not required, differ somewhat from the requirements of section 3 of
the Act of 1925. Thereunder, "the adopting parents or parent.., and
all the persons whose consent is necessary.., and any person concerned
individually or as a representative of an agency acting as an intermediary ... must appear in person ....
-41 The appearance of all these
persons, however, could be dispensed with in the court's discretion if
they lived outside the jurisdiction of the court or if the court deemed
their appearance unnecessary-provided that the necessary consents
were filed in writing with the court.4 2 Under section 423, however, the
appearance of any person may be dispensed with should the court find
that "their presence is unnecessary." 43 There is no explicit mention of
the jurisdictional limitations of the previous provision. This latter omission may reflect the broadened scope of the venue provision of the new
Act.4 4 It could be that with more lenient venue provisions there will
be fewer problems with the availability of persons concerned.
Once the hearing commences, section 424, entitled "Testimony; Investigation," outlines the procedure. This section provides an expanded
version of the previous requirements under section 3 of the Act of 1925.
That Act provided for the hearing of testimony as to the desirability
of the proposed adoption and for the holding of an investigation by an
agency or individual designated by the court. Presently required is
"disclosure of all costs and fees of any type paid or to be paid to any
person or institution in connection with the adoption, including the
fees of any intermediary." 45 The precautionary reason for such a disclosure is clear and this requirement appears desirable. In addition,
section 424 states that because, in nearly all cases, an investigation will
already have been made, the court now has the discretion to "rely in
whole or in part upon a report earlier made under section 335. .... 46
This also would seem a sound provision to provide for more rapid and
orderly administration of adoption proceedings.
The final section of Article IV, section 425, maintains almost verbatim the previous admonition of section 1(d) of the Act of 1925 dealing
40. Id. § 422.
41. Pa. Adoption Act of 1925, as amended, § 3.
42. Id.
43. Pa. Adoption Act of 1970, § 423.
44. Id. § 202.
45. Id. § 424.
46. Id.
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with religions of the adopting and natural parents. Section 425 states
that:
Whenever possible, the adopting parents shall be of the same
religious faith as the natural parents of the adoptee. No person
shall be denied the benefits of this act because of a 47religious belief
in the use of spiritual means or prayer for healing.
Whether or not this writer agrees with the wisdom of this provision, it
is felt that further discussion here would not add to positions already
espoused. In light of the controversy on the subject, 4 it is sufficient to
note that the legislature has seen fit to perpetuate this provision.
CONCLUSION

Because the Adoption Act of 1970 is at this writing untested by the
courts of Pennsylvania, and because adoption practice in this Commonwealth may be changed greatly by some of the Act's provisions, this
article has been written. Though admittedly not an exhaustive study
of the entire Act, it is felt that the treatment accorded the various provisions indicates and discusses the more substantive changes. The conceivable pitfalls and difficulties which the courts and practicing attorneys may encounter under the terms of the Act have been dealt with in
terms of priorities arbitrarily set up the writer. Although others may
devise their own sets of values, it is felt that those sections of the Act
which are of most serious import have been dealt with and recognized
as potentially troublesome areas in the use and interpretation of this
Adoption Act of 1970. It is hoped that the coverage here provided will
be of some service to the profession and will serve, at least, as a point
of departure for those who will practice under this Act.*
JoHN M. RIDLON
47.
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48. See, e.g., Litzenberger, The Religious Factor in Adoption Proceedings, 65 DICK.
L. REv. 60 (1960), Lustig, The Religious Factor in New York Adoption Proceedings, 18
SYRACUSE L. RayV. 825 (1966), and Hauser, Adoption and Religious Control, 54 ABA J. 771
(1968).
A For proposed new Rule 30 governing practice and procedure under The Adoption
Act of 1970 and proposed forms, see PGH. L.J., Vol. 118, no. 12, December 1, 1970, p. 22.
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